re-zone the Daughter Parcels, but that even if the re-zoning was the intent of the 2003
Ordinance, such a re-zoning would have been void ab inilio given the lack of due notice
under 15.2-2204 and 15.2-2285. Even if the Defendants are correct in that the 30-day
statute of limitations bars the Plaintiff's complaint such that seeks the Court's
determination that the lack of notice under 15.2-2204 and 15.2-2285 renders the 2003
Ordinance invalid as it pertains to the Daughter Parcels*, it does not bar Plaintiff's basic
claim that the 2003 Ordinance, on its face, did not modify the zoning on the Daughter
Parcels.
The lack of proper notice as required by 15.2-2204 and 15.2-2285 is, among other
factors, evidence that City Council neither intended to nor actually did change the zoning
of the Daughter Parcels. Plaintiff here concedes, and conceded at oral argument on the
Defendant's Motion for Joinder, that amendment of his Complaint is likely necessary to
clarify this point. That said, far from only challenging a validly enacted ordinance,
Plaintiff is requesting the Court rule on whether in enacting the 2003 Ordinance re-zoned
the Daughter Parcels. The Plaintiff is asking the Court not to strike down the 2003
Ordinance, but rather interpret the 2003 Ordinance.
Given the fact that the Plaintiff is not asking the Court to strike down a validly
enacted ordinance, the 30-day statute of limitations relied on in Defendants' pleas in bar
is inapplicable. Additionally, because the 30-day statute of limitations is inapplicable,
*It should be noted that the Plaintiff does not concede the argument that the 30-day statute of limitations applies to a
challenge that an ordinance is void ab initio as Kole v. Chesapeake, 247 Va. 51 (1994) continues to be good law.